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The Life of  Soldiers during the Long Turkish War  
(1593–1606)
This study is concerned with the everyday lives, survival strategies, and social composition 
of  the German armed forces who served in the border fortresses and field units of  
the Imperial and Royal Army during the wars against the Ottoman Empire that were 
fought on the territory of  the Kingdom of  Hungary in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. This study shows that these troops enlisted to escape poverty and starvation, 
sometimes serving without weapons, and that their families often followed them onto 
Hungarian battlefields. As the rich source materials analyzed here demonstrate, however, 
their new positions confronted them with even greater challenges than they had faced 
previously, including the day-to-day threat of  mortality, epidemics, the vicissitudes of  
the weather, and the constant deprivations caused by idle mercenaries. They strove to 
support themselves through fraud and deceit, as well as by forcefully plundering their 
surroundings; nonetheless, volunteering for military service did not provide them with 
a permanent solution to the problem of  earning a living.
Keywords: Long Turkish War, German-speaking military in the Kingdom of  Hungary, 
survival strategies, subsistence
Introduction
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a significant number of  German-
speaking soldiers served on the territory of  the Kingdom of  Hungary, some 
of  them in the strategically important strongholds of  the Hungarian border-
fortress system that had been created along the Hungarian–Ottoman frontier 
starting in the late 1520s.1 
Hungarian historians have recently discussed the military’s coexistence with 
civil society, primarily townsfolk and the nobility, and in the cases of  Győr, Kassa 
(Kosice, Slovakia), Keszthely, and Murány (Muráň, Slovakia), such research 
has shed light on both the advantages and the disadvantages of  this forcible 
cohabitation. In general, it is clear that military objectives far outweighed the 
interests of  locals, whose freedoms and economic activity were restricted in 
1  Géza Pálffy, “A török elleni védelmi rendszer szervezetének története a kezdetektől a 18. század 
elejéig,” Történelmi Szemle 38, no. 2–3 (1996): 163–217.
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numerous regions. For instance, the army sometimes established connections 
with local handicraft industries, thereby creating competition for local guilds. 
And at the same time, while the presence of  the military created markets, foreign 
infantrymen in Kassa, for example, also developed relationships with the families 
of  German citizens there.2 Another significant portion of  the mercenaries from 
the Holy Roman Empire arrived in Hungary during one or another of  the military 
campaigns of  the sixteenth century: 1527, 1540, 1551–52, 1566. At the end of  
military operations, these hired forces tended to scatter and leave the country. 
However, when the continuous conflict between the Habsburg Monarchy and 
the Ottoman Empire escalated into all-out war again in 1593, it created a new 
situation. At the conclusion of  certain military operations, a significant portion 
of  these field troops did not disband, but rather found winter accommodations 
and remained in the Kingdom of  Hungary. However, until recently, we have 
had little information about such soldiers. International historical scholarship, 
though, has long dealt with important issues like the social composition of  the 
armed forces, everyday life in military camps, conflicts between soldiers and 
citizens, and the role of  women in the military.3  
With respect to the social composition of  the armed forces and the everyday 
lives of  soldiers, the Thirty Years’ War stands at the forefront of  both traditional 
and more recent German historiography. From the second half  of  the twentieth 
century onward, military, social, cultural, legal, and technological historians 
have examined the development and position of  the army in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, exploring its everyday life as if  the military were its own 
society, or an anthropologist’s small community.4 On the basis of  such research, 
2  Géza Pálffy, A császárváros védelmében. A győri főkapitányság története 1526–1598 (Győr: Győr-Moson-
Sopron Megyei Győri Levéltára, 1999), 185–92; István H. Németh, Várospolitika és gazdaságpolitika a 
16–17. századi Magyarországon, 2 vols. (Budapest: Gondolat–Magyar Országos Levéltár, 2004), 280–370; 
Ferenc Végh, Birodalmak határán – a Balaton partján: Keszthely végvárváros a XVI–XVII. században (Budapest: 
Históriaantik, 2007); Béla Sarusi Kiss, “Deutsche Soldaten in den ungarischen Grenzfestungen des 16. 
Jahrhunderts,” in Geteilt-Vereinigt. Beiträge zur Geschichte des Königreichs Ungarn in der Frühneuzeit (16–18. 
Jahrhundert), ed. Krisztián Csaplár-Degovics and István Fazekas (Berlin: Osteuropa-Zentrum Verlag, 2011), 
157–80.
3  Fritz Redlich, De praeda militari. Looting and Booty 1500–1815 (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1956); 
Barton C. Hacker, “Women and Military Institutions in Early Modern Europe: A Reconnaissance,” Signs 
6, no. 4 (1981): 643–71; John A. Lynn, Women, Armies, and Warfare in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 2008); Olaf  van Nimwegen, “The Transformation of  Army Organisation 
in Early-Modern Western Europe, c. 1500–1789, in European Warfare, ed. Frank Tallett and D. J. B. Trim 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 159–80.
4  The most important are as follows: Lásd: Peter Burschel, Söldner im Nordwestdeutschland des 16. und 17. 
Jahrhunderts: Sozialgeschichtliche Studien (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1994); Bernhard R. Kroener, 
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they have offered up finely shaded portraits of  the social composition of  the 
armed forces—that is, of  the economic, demographic, social, and climatic 
factors and changes which led a significant portion of  the population to see 
military service as a fundamental means of  survival. In addition to archival 
sources, German historians have recently turned toward soldiers’ diaries and 
memoirs, which are especially useful for historical examinations of  the way war 
was experienced and remembered in the period. From the Long Turkish War, 
however, we know of  only one short soldier’s diary.5 Thus in the course of  my 
research, I have gathered together official documents issued by military leaders 
and also relied on the sporadic data to be found in the works of  contemporary 
historians. On the basis of  these materials, I have sought answers to questions 
like the following: Why—or better yet, instead of  what—did these soldiers 
undertake such dangerous service? What sort of  martial virtues did they 
embody? How did they support themselves and their families? And what were 
their lives like in the camps?
Beckoned by the Enlistment Drum 
Prior to the present study, there has been no comprehensive research on this 
subject. Only Antonio Liepold’s 1998 monograph has dealt with the role played 
by the gentry of  the Holy Roman Empire and the Austrian Hereditary Lands in 
the wars against the Ottomans in the sixteenth century.6 German historiography 
and my own research would suggest that, generally speaking, all social strata—
from vagabonds to aristocrats—were represented among the ranks of  the 
cavalry and infantry that served in the Hungarian theater of  operations during 
the Long Turkish War. In the case of  the mounted soldiers, medieval military 
traditions continued to be observed. According to Lazarus von Schwendi’s 
“Vom Landsknecht zum Soldaten. Anmerkungen zu Sozialprestige, Selbstverständnis und Leistungsfähigkeit 
von Soldaten in den Armeen des 16. Jahrhunderts,” in Von Crecy bis Mohács. Kriegswesen im späten Mittelalter, 
(Vienna: Heeresgeschichtliches Museum, 1997); Antonio Liepold, Wider den Erbfeind christlichen Glaubens. Die 
Rolle des niederen Adels in den Türkenkriegen des 16. Jahrhunderts: Europäische Hochschulschriften. Reihe III. Geschichte 
und ihre Hilfswissenschaften. Band 767 (Frankfurt am Main–Berlin–Bern–New York–Paris–Vienna: Peter Lang 
Verlag, 1998); Hans Medick and Benjamin Marschke, Experiencing the Thirty Years War. A Brief  History with 
Documents (Boston–New York: Bedford and St. Martin’s, 2013).
5   “Tagebuch der Feldzüge des Regiments des Obristen Georg Freyherrn Ehrenreich. Besonders beim 
Gran und Eperies von 27. Julii 1604 bis 26. Octobris 1606 ausgeführet,” in Sammlung kleiner, noch ungedruckter 
Stücke, in welchen gleichzeitige Schriftsteller einzelne Abschnitte der ungarische Geschichte aufgezeichnet haben, vol. 1, ed. 
Martin Georg Kovachich (Ofen: n.p., 1805), 288–445.
6  Liepold 1998, passim.
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Cavalry Appointments (Reiterbestallung), the decrees of  the Imperial Diet of  1570 
in Speyer included a directive that only noblemen were to enlist in the cavalry.7 It 
was also common for hired horsemen to be selected from among the vassals of  
the recruiting colonel (Obrist).8 
In addition to the recruiting “enterprisers” (Militärunternehmer) and captains 
(Hauptmänner), there were also large numbers of  Southern German noblemen 
(from Bavaria, Tyrol, Württemberg, and Swabia), as well as wealthy urban 
patrician youths in the infantry. Their roles were not limited to offices on the 
staffs of  colonels or in the prima plana that directed these units (Fahne); they 
also enlisted as Doppelsöldner, mercenaries who volunteered for frontline duty 
in exchange for double pay. A good example is the Doppelsöldner registry for 
Karl Ludwig Graf  zu Sulz’s infantry regiment, dated July 16, 1602. According 
to this document, those equipped with a round shield (Rundschier) included 
even persons of  baronial descent, like Ulrich and Hans Leonhard Freiherr zu 
Spauer.9 One year later, Georg Leschenbrandt reported that large numbers of  
men from the nobility and gentry (Herren- und Rittenstand) of  Lower Austria had 
shown up to enlist in Georg Andreas von Hofkirchen’s infantry unit.10 In hopes 
of  opportunities for advancement, many captains became Doppelsöldner during 
the reorganization and merging of  regiments, as Emperor Rudolf  II’s letter to 
Archduke Matthias mentions in relation to Hans Prenier zu Stöbing’s regiment.11 
The majority of  these men had originally held the rank of  private first class 
7  Wilhelm Janko, Lazarus Freiherr von Schwendi oberster Feldhauptmann und Rath Kaiser Maximilian’’s II 
(Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller Hof- und Universitätsbuchhändler, 1871), 173, 177–78, 193; Fritz Redlich, 
The German Military Enterpriser [Entrepreneur?] and his Work Force. A Study in European Economic and Social 
History (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1965), 43. 
8  Brage Bei der Wieden, “Niederdeutsche Söldner vor dem Dreißigjährigen Krieg: Geistige und mentale 
Grenzen eines sozialen Raums,” in Krieg und Frieden. Militär und Gesellschaft in der Frühen Neuzeit, ed. Bernhard 
R. Kroener et al. (Paderborn–Munich–Vienna–Zürich: Schöningh Verlag, 1996), 98. The German military 
ranks mentioned in this article do not correspond cleanly to those of  the Anglo-American hierarchy. 
Obrist is roughly analogous to Colonel, Gefreite to noncommissioned officer, and Hauptmann to captain.
9  Österreichisches Staatsarchiv (ÖStA) Kriegsarchiv (KA) Hofkriegsratakten (HKRA) Wien Expedit 
(Exp.) 1602. Juli No. 15); Reinhard Baumann, Das Söldnerwesen im 16. Jahrhundert im bayerischen und süddeutschen 
Beispiel. Eine gesellschaftsgeschichtliche Untersuchung, Miscellanea Bavarica Monacensia 79 (Munich: Wölfle 
Verlag, 1978), 66–68, 96; Wieden, “Niederdeutsche Söldner vor dem Dreißigjährigen Krieg,” 94; Kroener, 
“Vom Landsknecht zum Soldaten,” 82; Liepold, Wider den Erbfeind christlichen Glaubens, 133–35.
10  ÖStA HKRA Wien Exp. 1603 August. No. 99.
11  ÖStA KA HKRA Wien Registratur (Reg.) 1601. Oktober No. 136.
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(Gefreite), often given to soldiers of  noble blood, either in the ’colonel’s unit or 
his deputy’s.12
What led these noblemen to enter the service of  a military enterprisers? Like 
advantageous marriages, enlistment in the military had become an important 
means of  improving one’s lot. The pay and the spoils of  war could make it 
financially profitable, and it also served as a strategy for social advancement. And 
beyond these possible gains in income and prestige, the desire for adventure also 
played a part in the decisions of  the counts, lords, and youthful members of  the 
urban elite who signed up. In addition, the revival of  the idea of  a crusade against 
the Ottoman Empire was also a motivating factor for members of  the nobility 
and the urban elite.13 Most of  the noblemen who fought in the infantry were 
prevented by their poor financial situations from serving in mounted units.14
However, the vast majority who enlisted were ordinary men from villages 
and cities. In keeping with a medieval practice called Gleve, aristocratic horsemen 
maintained entourages (lange Reihe) of  six to twelve persons who escorted them 
into battle.15 The main body of  the infantry was also recruited from among the 
commoners. In the case of  noblemen, financial necessity tended to mix with the 
desire for personal glory; commoners’ main reason for showing up to enlist was 
to make a living. The population explosion in sixteenth-century Europe created 
a surplus of  labor and a price surge, which, together with the so-called little 
ice age and the resultingly poor crop production, had a severe effect on living 
conditions.16 The hope of  monthly payment and the loot enterprisers promised 
attracted the impoverished, who were struggling to supply themselves and their 
12  József  Kelenik, “A kézi lőfegyverek jelentősége a hadügyi forradalom kibontakozásában. A császári-
királyi hadsereg fegyverzetének jellege Magyarországon a tizenöt éves háború éveiben,” Hadtörténelmi 
Közlemények 104, no. 3 (1991): 118.
13  See the study by Brian Sandberg in the present issue. Jan Paul Niederkorn, Die europäischen Mächte 
und der “Lange Turkenkrieg” Kaiser Rudolfs II (1593–1606) (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie 
der Wissenschaft, 1993), 390–91; Wieden, “Niederdeutsche Söldner vor dem Dreißigjährigen Krieg,” 97–
98; Liepold, Wider den Erbfeind christlichen Glaubens, 125–27; Péter Sahin-Tóth, “A francia katolikus ligától 
Kanizsáig. Henri de Lorraine-Chaligny életpályája (1570–1600),” in A középkor szeretete. Tanulmányok Sz. 
Jónás Ilona tiszteletére, ed. Gábor Klaniczay et al. (Budapest: ELTE BTK, 1999), 453–65. 
14  Baumann, Das Söldnerwesen im 16. Jahrhundert, 69); Kroener, “Vom Landsknecht zum Soldaten,” 81–83.
15  Janko, Lazarus Freiherr von Schwendi, 173, 177–78, 193); Redlich, The German Military Enterpriser, 43); 
Liepold, Wider den Erbfeind christlichen Glaubens, 96, 125.
16  Kurt Klein, “Die Bevölkerung Österreichs vom Beginn des 16. bis zur Mitte des 18. Jahrhunderts 
(mit einem Abriß der Bevölkerungsentwicklung von 1754 bis 1869),” in Beiträge zur Bevölkerungs- und 
Sozialgeschichte Österreichs, ed. Heimold Helczmanovszki (Vienna: Im Auftrag des Österreichischen 
Statistischen Zentralamtes 1973), 47–111. Peter Burschel, Söldner im Nordwestdeutschland des 16. und 17. 
Jahrhunderts: Sozialgeschichtliche Studien (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1994), 85. 
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families with more and more expensive food on smaller and smaller wages.17 
These included the suburban poor (guild apprentices, day laborers, domestic 
servants),18 craftsmen in under-remunerated professions (bakers, weavers, fabric 
dyers, tailors),19 and agricultural workers who had lost their means of  subsistence 
to population growth and the resulting fragmentation of  property (peasants, 
servants, day laborers, and farmhands).20 Wandering beggars, drifters, criminals, 
clergymen, and students also enlisted in the military,21 and even women gave 
soldiering a try.22 Thus, the hierarchy within the army faithfully imitated the 
established structure of  society. This is why Brage Bei der Wieden referred to 
the sixteenth-century German army as a “parallel society” (Nebengesellschaft).23
The 1570 edicts (Artikelbrief) decreed that pikemen and gunmen had to 
own both proper armaments and uniforms in order to be mustered.24 However, 
penniless recruits from the fringes of  society possessed neither.25 Even in the 
second half  of  sixteenth century, military enterprisers had to buy weapons 
in bulk, thus enabling anyone to enlist for mercenary service. By the time of  
the Long Turkish War, this state of  affairs had become permanent, as the 
following two accounts demonstrate. On June 1, 1595, the monarch ordered his 
comptroller’’s office (Buchhalterei) to send the financial accounts for Oberhauptmann 
Hans Geizkofler’s three units to Michael Zeller, the military cashier in Hungary. 
According to this document, equipping the 900-man unit required 5410 Gulden, 
9 Kreutzer, and 2 Pfennig, while the soldiers’’ monthly wages amounted to 
8565 Gulden.26 An account from January of  1601 is even more telling about 
the armament needs of  the entire force. According to it, there were only 1430 
17  Redlich, The German Military Enterpriser, 127.
18  Reinhard Baumann, Georg von Frundsberg. Der Vater der Landsknechte und Feldhauptmann von Tirol (Munich: 
Süddeutscher Verlag, 1984), 46; Friedrich Edelmayer, Söldner und Pensionäre. Das Netzwerk Philipps II. im 
Heiligen Römischen Reich (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2002), 256.
19  Burschel, Söldner im Nordwestdeutschland, 58–70.
20  Baumann, Das Söldnerwesen im 16. Jahrhundert, 85; Burschel, Söldner im Nordwestdeutschland, 72–87.
21  Janko, Lazarus Freiherr von Schwendi, 173, 177–78, 193; Bernd Roeck, Außenseiter, Randgruppen, 
Minderheiten. Fremde im Deutschland der frühen Neuzeit (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993), 76; 
Burschel, Söldner im Nordwestdeutschland, 88–96.
22  Tobias Coberus, Observationum medicarum castrensium Hungaricarum decades tres (Helmstadt: Fridericus 
Lüderwaldus, 1685), 44.
23  Wieden, “Niederdeutsche Söldner vor dem Dreißigjährigen Krieg,” 97–98.
24  Janko, Lazarus Freiherr von Schwendi, 199–200.
25  Friedrich Blau, Die deutschen Landsknechte (Kettwig: Phaidon Akademische Verlag-Gesellschaft, 1985), 
25.
26  ÖStA Hofkammerarchiv (HKA), Niederösterreichische Gedenkbücher, 1595–1596. Bd. 157, fol. 
127r–29v.
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handheld firearms in the Vienna armory at that time, while another 19,990 were 
to be obtained before the next campaign.27 The Cavalry Appointments directory 
regulated weaponry and uniforms for mounted soldiers. Enlisted noblemen 
were instructed to provide their entourages with proper apparel that would 
protect both the soldiers and their equipment from the elements. In addition, 
every sixth retainer was to be armed with a fine musket.28 Impoverished soldiers, 
recruited from the periphery of  society, tended to arrive for enlistment without 
any weapons.29
The actual military value of  Western mercenaries is subject to question; 
Géza Perjés considered them to be the scum of  society.30  Whether evaluating 
their performance in the infantry or the cavalry, it is hard to give a precise 
answer. It is arguable that horsemen from high-born families would have had the 
requisite knowledge of  techniques for fighting from the saddle. The documents 
show, however, that this was not always true of  their entourages. On July 19, 
1598, Johann Eustach von Westernach, in describing the enlistment of  Georg 
Friedrich von Hohenlohe’s black riders, reported that counts and noblemen 
recruited many young boys and demanded that they receive the same payment as 
experienced soldiers.31 Apparently, this problem was a persistent one: Hermann 
Cristoph von Russworm, sent to investigate the rebellion of  600 Dutch mounted 
gunmen, advised Archduke Matthias that Philipp Graf  zu Solms’ soldiers should 
be retained with monthly payments and renewals (reductio) because they were 
tried and tested soldiers who knew the enemy well, and were thus of  more use 
to the emperor than an inexperienced band of  recruits.32
The case was the same with the infantry: there are examples both of  
mercenaries’’ merit and of  their incompetence as well. An undated and 
anonymous fragment, annotated by Gundaker von Liechtenstein, asserted that 
hired forces should be well-versed in wielding their weapons, which experience 
was at least partly dependent on their financial status.33 Our sources from the 
27  ÖStA KA Bestallungen (Best.) 1601/672); József  Kelenik, “A kézi lőfegyverek jelentősége,” 49.
28  Janko, Lazarus Freiherr von Schwendi, 173, 177–78, 193); Redlich, The German Military Enterpriser, 43; 
Liepold, Wider den Erbfeind christlichen Glaubens, 96, 125.
29  Baumann, Das Söldnerwesen im 16. Jahrhundert, 66.
30  Géza Perjés, “Az Oszmán Birodalom európai háborúinak katonai kérdései (1356–1699),” Hadtörténelmi 
Közlemények 14 (1967), 339–70.
31  ÖStA KA HKRA Prag. No. 17.
32  ÖStA KA HKRA Wien Reg. 1603 Juli. No. 75.
33  Eugen Heischmann, Die Anfange des stehenden Heeres In Österreich (Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 
1925), 48.
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Long War suggest a wide variety of  experience levels among the troops. In June of  
1598, Westernach and Zacharias Geizkofler, in describing the muster of  Johann 
Friedrich von Mörsburg’’s regiment, reported that among the Doppelsöldner, those 
wielding “short arms” and two-handed swords had been fighting in wars for 
periods ranging from 10 to 30 years, and that even the least experienced among 
them had served for 5 or 6 years—in Italy, Brabant, the Netherlands, France, 
Burgundy, or Hungary. The two commissioners lavished praise on the regiment’’s 
musketeers as well. Their report says that of  a thousand such soldiers, there were 
perhaps 25 or fewer who had no previous combat experience. They reported 
that quite a few of  the gunmen had served on French, Dutch, Piemontese, or 
Hungarian battlefields, and that the others were strong, if  fairly old. The latter 
remark was not a random addition by Geizkofler and Westernach. The document 
also states that the military enterprisers had not found enough arquebusiers, and 
that there were too few musketeers to reassign any of  them to the arquebusiers. 
Thus the two muster officers were forced to register many inexperienced 
youths.34 This is a single but not isolated example which clearly illustrates the 
range of  experience in the infantry brigades of  the Imperial and Royal Army. 
All in all, some of  the soldiers, especially the Doppelsöldner and musketeers, were 
considered skilled warriors. Some weeks later, after inspecting Ludwig Graf  zu 
Sulz’’s infantry regiment, Westernach reported that most of  the enlisted were 
strong, healthy, battle-tested soldiers who could be truly useful to the emperor.35 
In addition, there are many references suggesting that a large portion of  the 
soldiers who were dismissed enlisted again in newly formed regiments, and that 
many commissioned muster inspectors had favorable opinions of  these soldiers 
as well.36 In contrast, elements of  the Bestallungen and professional reports 
indicate that there were rookies who had joined the ranks of  the arquebusiers 
and were unskilled in the use of  their weapons.37 In my opinion, however, this 
was not a significant problem. It was natural that inexperienced recruits from 
the fringes of  society would begin their service among the arquebusiers. On 
the one hand, they could afford only the cheapest weapons, and on the other, 
much more practice would have been required to learn the weaponry techniques 
and battlefield formations of  the Doppelsöldner. Unlike polearm-wielding soldiers, 
gunmen could learn the basic skills for handling their weapons in just a couple 
34  ÖStA KA HKRA Prag 1598. No. 18.
35  Ibid., No. 17.
36  Ibid., No. 18; ÖStA HKRA Wien Exp. 1603 August. No. 99.
37  ÖStA KA Alte Feldakten (AFA) 1602/3/5; Heischmann, Die Anfange, 45–47.
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of  days, and they could move more freely on the battlefield, even in the more 
closed tertios, or pike-and-shot formations. Their lack of  experience did not 
necessarily put them at a tactical disadvantage either, as volley firing could do 
great damage to their Ottoman opponents.38 The only problem arose when 
an arquebusier, in hopes of  greater payment, decided to enlist the following 
year as a musketeer or Doppelsöldner without having mastered the given weapon. 
According to Geizkofler’s 1603 report, this was common in the Imperial and 
Royal Army. It must also be noted that such efforts to earn promotions and 
the consequent higher wages were standard career strategies not limited to the 
arquebusiers.39
Based on the above observations, I would argue that neither opinion at 
either extreme is correct: I do not think that a completely unprepared mass of  
soldiers from the Holy Roman Empire was assigned to the Hungarian theater 
of  operations. But it would also be a mistake to assume that a fully professional, 
well-trained infantry and cavalry entered the fray against the Ottoman army 
during this fifteen-year war. In reality, there are examples that illustrate both 
cases: we find unqualified greenhorns alongside mercenaries who had fought in 
numerous campaigns and knew their weapons well. 
Regular Wages as the Basis of  Subsistence?
Even though more volunteers usually showed up at musters than could be 
enrolled, and even though several units enlisted more recruits than the Bestallung 
called for,40 the total sum designated for payouts to mercenaries increased steadily 
over the course of  the Long Turkish War. This phenomenon is apparently 
the result of  three closely interrelated factors. The negotiated payments were 
dependent on (1) food prices, which were increasing due to the aforementioned 
little ice age, (2) the lobbying efforts of  war contractors, and (3) the interests 
of  recruited mercenaries.41 Sources describing the frequency and the amounts 
of  the payments mercenaries actually received are fairly limited, thus we can 
only conjecture based on the written records to which we have access. In my 
38  Kelenik, “A kézi lőfegyverek jelentősége,” 87, 94.
39  Heischmann, Die Anfange, 45–48. 
40  ÖStA KA Best. 464/1593; ÖStA KA AFA 1594/4/7; ÖStA KA AFA 1594/6/3; ÖStA KA Best. 
580/1598; ÖStA KA Best. 653/1600; ÖStA KA Best. 695/1601ÖStA KA AFA 1605/12/1; Kelenik, “A 
kézi lőfegyverek jelentősége,” 99–100.
41  Zoltán Péter Bagi, A császári-királyi mezei hadsereg a tizenöt éves háborúban. Hadszervezet, érdekérvényesítés, 
reformkísérletek (Budapest: Históriaantik Könyvkiadó, 2011), 213–34.
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opinion, however, it is logical to look at the various kinds of  payments made to 
mercenaries, from their enlistment and muster until their disbandment.
The first sum of  money to which an enlisted soldier was theoretically entitled 
was the Anritt- or Laufgeld, an advance payment that enabled an enrolled soldier 
to travel from the location of  his recruitment to the site of  his unit’’s muster 
inspection. Soldiers from distant provinces who enlisted in newly formed units 
were likely to receive this money. However, it was not always enough to cover all 
their expenses, as the distance between the towns where they were recruited and 
ultimately inspected could be several hundred kilometers; sometimes prospective 
soldiers simply spent this money on drinks at nearby taverns.42 In some cases, the 
recruit might get an advance on his first monthly payment, which was recorded 
on the muster registry. Troops who had already served on Hungarian battlefields 
could expect to receive this sort of  advance again if  they continued their service. 
In December 1597, for instance, Zacharias Geizkofler and Bartholomäus Pezzen 
negotiated with Seifried von Kollonich and Heinrich Matthias von Thurn, 
convincing them to remain in their regiment for an Anrittgeld of  4 Gulden and a 
monthly wage of  12 Gulden. However, these negotiations ultimately failed, and 
thus these advances were never disbursed.43
Soldiers did not always receive the per diem promised to those who were 
awaiting inspection. Payments to Tettau’s horsemen, for instance, began on the 
10th day of  the month, not on the date of  their muster. In his July 16, 1598 report, 
the commissioned inspection officer explained this seeming bonus payment 
by noting that the horsemen had never received the Nachtgeld they had been 
promised.44 In most cases, however, the problem was not a failure to distribute 
the assigned sums, but rather that the amounts were too meager to keep up with 
ever-increasing food prices, which made it difficult for soldiers to provide for 
themselves, their relatives, or their horses.
Like the advances, the first monthly payments following a muster also seem 
to have been uncertain. In their report on the 1598 muster of  the Mörsburg 
regiment, Westernach and Geizkofler noted that the soldiers were dissatisfied 
with their negotiated payments. Among other grievances, they complained that 
they had hardly received any of  the money for their third month of  service, 
42  Krüger, Kersten, “Kriegsfinanzen und Reichsrecht im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert,” in Krieg und Frieden. 
Militär und Gesellschaft in der Frühen Neuzeit, ed. Bernhard R. Kroener et al. (Paderborn–Munich–Vienna–
Zürich: Schöningh Verlag, 1996), 49.
43  ÖStA KA HKRA Prag 1597. No. 9.
44  Ibid., 1598. No. 23.
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and that their first month’’s payments had gone almost entirely toward their 
weapons expenses. In their opinion, the prices for the gear prescribed by the 
Capitulatio for Doppelsöldner, musketeers, and arquebusiers (11, 9, and 6 Gulden, 
respectively) were too high; they were also concerned that they would not receive 
the remaining two months’’ payment in full.45 
In the period between the first month’s payment and the next muster, military 
enterprisers often received only an advance for the following months, out of  
which they had to distribute their underlings’’ wages. On November 2, 1604, 
Giorgio Basta summoned the colonels (Obristen) of  his army and told them that 
their infantry and cavalry would receive their pay and uniforms only in Kassa. 
As a token, they handed out 2 Gulden to each soldier. However, the soliders 
would not receive another payment until January of  1605, and this was not a 
full month’s wages either, but merely another advance collected from the towns 
around Eperjes (Prešov, Slovakia). By June 19, 1605, this lack of  wages had led 
to threats of  mutiny. The infantrymen of  the Puchheim regiment protested in 
front of  the house of  the judge in Eperjes, demanding full payment of  the five 
month’s wages that had been denied them. The situation was resolved by the 
colonel’s deputy, Lazarus von Schwendi, who ordered that money and supplies 
be handed out to the soldiers.46
However, even these advances were not always paid. Having arrived at a 
muster of  Walloon infantrymen, Geizkofler and Pezzen wrote in their December 
3, 1597 report that though the officers had received the assigned funds, they did 
not disburse them to the sick.47 In January of  1598, commissioned inspector Jakob 
Püchler reported the following from a Walloon army muster at Érsekújvár: the 
officers of  Alphonso Montecuccoli’s cavalry had requested that their advances 
not be deducted from their balances because their military enterpriser, though 
he had received the money, had never paid it to them.48 Russworm, Sulz, and 
Mörsburg described similar experiences in their 1604 reports.49 To this day, no 
documents confirming that the soldiers received their siege and battle payments 
have ever surfaced.
45  Ibid. No. 18.
46  “Tagebuch der Feldzüge des Regiments des Obristen Georg Freyherrn Ehrenreich. Besonders beim 
Gran und Eperies von 27. Julii 1604 bis 26. Octobris 1606 ausgeführet,” in Sammlung kleiner, noch ungedruckter 
Stücke, 299, 308, 331.
47  ÖStA KA HKRA Prag 1597. No. 9.
48  Ibid., 1598. No. 26.
49  Ibid., Wien Exp. 1604 Mai. No. 89.
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The army cashier sometimes issued extraordinary payments. As prescribed 
in the Bestallungbrief and in the Artikelbrief, troops who took part in a successful 
siege or battle were entitled to an extra month’s pay.50 On October 7, 1598, 
Westernach sent a fairly strange letter to the Emperor from the military camp in 
Buda. After the capture of  Víziváros, the colonels and their troops, who had been 
hired with imperial funds, demanded their siege bonuses. However, the imperial 
army commissioner would only disburse this money if  the Christian troops were 
to take the castle itself; otherwise, he argued, the already secured lower castle 
would be lost again.51 In December of  1601, Archduke Matthias informed the 
troop commanders who had taken part in the capture of  Székesfehérvár and the 
consequent battle at Sárrét that the Emperor had denied their requests for siege 
and battle bonuses, along with their pleas to be compensated for the damage 
done to their regiments.52 The reason behind the Court Military Council’s 
decision may well have been a chronic lack of  money, given that the regiments 
of  those making these demands—Hofkirchen, Adolf  von Althan, Preiner, and 
Hans Wendel von Pernhausen—had participated in both military operations.53
Whether soldiers resigned or continued their service, the commissioned 
muster officer would negotiate their pay with the military enterpriser who had 
enlisted them. In the former case, even if  their agreements specified the payments 
to be made to the soldiers (or to their widows and orphans), such stipulations 
were not always honored. In some cases, not even this final payment—already 
diminished by deductions for advances and food expenses—would be fully paid 
in cash. Instead, soldiers were issued bills of  credit, the so-called Restzettel, in the 
amount they were owed,54 which bills could be redeemed at the army cashier’s 
office.55 In many cases, colonels, other officers, or sometimes even civilians would 
purchase these bills of  credit from the soldiers and demand compensation for 
them at a later date.56
The situation for soldiers who continued their service was hardly better. 
As one captain of  a reenlisted Walloon infantry unit explained in a letter in 
50  Janko, Lazarus Freiherr von Schwendi, 202.
51  ÖStA KA HKRA Prag 1598. No. 24.
52  ÖStA KA HKRA Wien Reg. 1601 Dezember. No. 37; ÖStA KA HKRA Wien Reg. 1601 Dezember 
No. 53.
53  HHStA Hungarica Allgemeine Akten Fasc. 140. Fol. 134r–137v; Gusztáv Gömöry, “Székesfehérvár 
visszavétele 1601-ben és újbóli elvesztése 1602-ben,” Hadtörténelmi Közlemények 5 (1892): 611–13.
54  Heischmann, Die Anfange, 193–95.
55  ÖStA KA AFA 1596/1/9 ½.  
56  Heischmann, Die Anfange, 193–195.
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February of  1596, the proposed inducement to re-up (a half-month’s pay plus 
food) was insufficient, especially considering that his soldiers had not received 
the first month’s pay promised by the Accordo. They thus demanded that they be 
dismissed and provided with documents of  passage that would enable them to 
return home.57
It is not surprising, therefore, that military enterprisers in the Hungarian 
theater of  operations had to offer their mercenaries “incentives”. On the one 
hand, mercenaries were motivated by these irregularly issued monthly payments; 
on the other, as Parker has demonstrated in the case of  the Netherlands’ Spanish 
army,58 continually rising food prices also compelled them to enlist.
Alternative Means of  Making a Living
As mercenaries had to provide for themselves and their families, they had to 
seek other sources of  income in addition to—or instead of—their “normal” pay, 
which came only irregularly, or not at all for months. Petty fraud, the systematic 
looting of  their environment, and family members’ incomes helped them 
mitigate the severity of  their destitution. 
Minor Circles of  Deception
Even the Artikelbrief accepted at the Imperial Diet of  1570 in Speyer contains 
several paragraphs addressing soldiers’ various cons, swindles, and schemes. 
According to this document, the swapping of  weapons and gear between 
mercenaries was prohibited. It also defined the length of  the month to be served 
and the corresponding payment, and also recommended execution for those 
who deserted or took unauthorized leave after receiving their wages. It also made 
it a capital offence to enlist as a mercenary under two different captains or in two 
different places, which some did in hopes of  doubling their money. To eliminate 
this possibility, recruits were supposed to fill out their muster documents with 
their given and family names, as well as their place of  origin. Officers were 
obliged to ensure that everyone served in the campaign with their own weapons 
57  ÖStA KA HKRA Wien Exp. 1596 Februar. No. 113.
58  Parker, The Army of  Flanders and the Spanish Road 1567–1659, 162–64.
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and armor. In addition, enterprisers had to make sure not to enlist anyone from 
another infantry unit or from the cavalry.59
Apart from the types of  fraud referred to in the Artikelbrief, there are other 
instances of  deception in the contemporary sources. An order issued by the 
Hofrat on April 12, 1600 prohibited enterprisers from enrolling vineyard laborers 
(Hauer) for military service. Their enlistment was discouraged as they sometimes 
deceived both the vineyard owners and the recruiting captains. They did not 
do their work in the wineries, nor did they show up at the musters, stealing and 
damaging crops as they migrated to and fro.60
It also happened that enterprisers and enlisted men were partners in such 
schemes, the unit commander secretly dismissing his soldiers and keeping their 
wages for himself. To keep his ruse from being discovered, the commander 
would hire day laborers at minimal cost to “stand in for the roll call” and then 
depart, as related by a patent issued on November 10, 1600.61
Pillaging as a Means of  Survival
Plunder and pillage were everyday activities for the enlisted, from their muster 
and encampment until their disbandment, despite the fact that the Artikelbrief 
recommended the death penalty for anyone who engaged in such acts.62 Even so, 
it did little to discourage them. On the one hand, as Zacharias Geizkofler pointed 
out in his report dated January 11, 1597, the Dutch cavalry was accustomed 
to pillaging and marauding.63 The next year, Martin Crusius, a Greek professor 
at Tübingen University, noted in his journal that Georges Bayer de Boppard’s 
Walloon infantrymen had caused extensive damage at Pfuhl (near Ulm), going 
so far as to burn down 17 houses.64 On the other hand, the soldiers’ daily 
payments were insufficient to sustain them. In his May 15, 1598 letter to Rudolf  
59  Janko, Lazarus Freiherr von Schwendi, 199–201, 206, 208; Hans-Michael Möller, Das Regiment der 
Landsknechte. Untersuchungen zu Verfassung, Recht und Selbstverständnis in deutschen Söldnerheeren des 16. Jahrhunderts. 
Frankfurter historische Abhandlungen 12 (Wiesbaden: Steiner Verlag, 1976), 29.
60  HHStA MEA Mandate, Patente und Passbriefe in Kriegssachen (MPP) Konv. 1. Fol. 116r.–17v.
61  Redlich, The German Military Enterpriser, 50–51.
62  Janko, Lazarus Freiherr von Schwendi, 202, 205.
63  Johennes Müller, “Der Anteil der schwäbischen Kreistruppen an dem Türkenkrieg Kaiser Rudolf  II. 
von 1595 bis 1597,” Zeitschrift des Historischen Vereins für Schwaben und Neuburg. Achtundzwanzigister Jahrgang 28 
(1901): 246–47.
64  Péter Sahin-Tóth, “Egy lotaringiai nemes a ’hosszú török háborúban’: Georges Bayer de Boppard,” in 
Változatok a történelemre. Tanulmányok Székely György tiszteletére, Monumenta Historica Budapestinensia XIV, 
ed. Gyöngyi Erdei et al. (Budapest: Budapest Történeti Múzeum, 2004), 303.
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II, Archduke Matthias reported that mercenaries from the Russworm infantry 
regiment, while waiting for their muster in Lower Austria, received four Kreutzer 
a day with which to provide for themselves and their families. However, as the 
author argued, this was so meager—not even enough to buy bread—that the 
soldiers simply stole whatever they needed to survive from poor local subjects. 
Thus, the Archduke proposed a doubling of  the daily payment for those waiting 
to be mustered. In addition, he allowed taxes on the locals to be decreased or 
eliminated altogether.65
The most problematic form of  tax increase levied on local subjects was 
the repeated postponement of  the day of  muster. According to a detailed note 
compiled by members of  the Lower Austrian nobility in 1602, Hofkirchen’s 
3000 infantrymen waited to be mustered at Krems for 36 days. Sulz’s regiment 
had to wait 42 days at Tull for the muster commissioners. Hans Ernst von 
Sprinzenstein’s unit had to stay idle for 73 days until their muster. In addition, 
the mounted arquebusiers hired by the Lower Austrian noblemen were given an 
extra 20,000 Rheingulden over and above their allotted wages in hopes of  stopping 
their harassment of  poor local subjects.66
The prolongation of  marches also imposed significant burdens on local 
populations. According to the aforementioned note, 3000 Walloons spent 14 
days on a march over land and water across Lower Austria; the infantry hired 
by the Upper Austrian nobility spent 10 days; the Salzburg army 16 days; and 
Philipp Otto Graf  zu Salm, Wild- und Rheingraf ’s 500 riders took 23 days. On 
such occasions, local inhabitants had to provide supplies not only for the troops, 
but for the commissioned inspectors as well, not to mention the constant abuses 
of  power they had to endure.67
The armies that appeared at muster sites for disbandment also caused great 
damage. As the waiting time for the muster increased, so did the burdens on the 
local population. Note the following data from the compiler of  the previously 
cited Lower Austrian registry: Kollonich’s 1000 horsemen, while waiting to be 
disbanded in the area of  Marchfeld and Ebzersdorf, parasitized the population 
for 21 days, while the 2000 Austrian infantrymen at Hainburg did likewise for 21 
days. One thousand soldiers from Salzburg did so for 5 days at the Schwadorf  
estate, while the infantry hired by the Upper Austrian noblemen spent 46 idle 
65  ÖStA KA Best. 621/1599.
66  HHStA Kriegsakten (Ka) Karton (Kt.) 31. Konv. 1590–1603. Fol. 100r-v.
67  HHStA Ka Kt. 31. Konv. 1590–1603. Fol. 100v.
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days in the vicinity of  Fischamand.68 Geizkofler and Pezzen seem justified in 
suggesting in their December 3, 1597 report that the quickly and competently 
executed muster, reorganization, and disbandment of  the Royal and Imperial 
troops stationed at Pozsony (Bratislava, Slovakia) saved the subject population 
approximately a hundred thousand Gulden.69
Those who remained in service were ordered into winter encampments 
by the Court’s Military Council. As this was enormously expensive, Rudolf  II 
recommended in an October 1601 letter that wages for these months should be 
decreased, or that two month’s payment should simply be skipped.70
To spare Austria, Walloons were usually quartered in Hungarian territories, 
where nearby counties, towns, and villages were to provide for them. However, 
as they were underpaid, soldiers often “acquired” supplies from the vicinity of  
their accommodations.71 In the records of  the patrician conclaves of  Sopron, 
Vas, and Zala counties, there are recurrent entries complaining about instances 
of  Walloon and French extortion in their villages, which led them to petition 
Archduke Matthias to have these soldiers transferred.72
The German military was quartered in Lower Austria, usually in Vienna, 
either in the towns and villages along the Hungarian border or in the territory of  
Habsburg Hungary.73 Their payments for extended service were, again, erratic 
or missing, which led them to take essentials like food and firewood from local 
subjects by force. The February 23 entry of  the Court Military Council’s 1595 
protocol relates that Andreas Medwe was sent to Helckendorf  to investigate 
crimes committed by the mercenaries of  Jakob Hannibal von Raitenau’s 
regiment, including the murder of  a peasant.74 Some months later, in December 
of  1595, Raitenau’s German soldiers were again involved in a series of  incidents. 
Because of  the aforementioned huge amount of  unpaid wages,75 the remaining 
army that was housed on the outskirts of  Vienna began systematically robbing 
68  Ibid., 100v–101r.
69  ÖStA KA HKRA Prag 1597. No. 9.
70  ÖStA KA HKRA Wien Reg. 1601. Oktober. No. 136.
71  ÖStA KA AFA 1599/8/12.
72  Irén Bilkei and Éva Turbuly, Zala vármegye közgyűlési jegyzőkönyveinek regesztái 1555–1711, I, Zalai 
Gyűjtemény 29 (Zalaegerszeg: Zala Megyei Levéltár, 1989), 632. c., 640. c., 656. c., 665. c; Éva Turbuly, 
Sopron vármegye közgyűlési jegyzőkönyveinek regesztái 1595–1608, II. rész (Sopron: Győr-Moson-Sopron Megye 
Soproni Levéltár, 2002), 231. c., 243. c., 244. c., 295. c; 410. c., 432. c. 
73  ÖStA KA AFA 1595/12 /1 ¼; HHStA MEA MPP Konv. 2. Fol. 146r–47v; Heischmann, Die Anfange, 
228–45.
74  ÖStA KA Hofkriegsrat-Wien Pr. Exp. Bd. 194. Fol. 196v. 1595. 23 Februar.
75  ÖStA KA AFA 1595/12/1 ¼.
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the population. Their transgressions ceased only when certain key figures were 
captured and executed on December 20.76
The army that was stationed in Upper Hungary also imposed a great burden 
on the population of  the neighboring counties. This is why the local nobility 
petitioned the Emperor on April 30, 1603 with a detailed depiction of  the soldiers’ 
plundering of  the locals. According to their petition, they had complained several 
times about the damage done by soldiers of  various nationalities, especially 
mounted gunmen wearing white, green, and blue coats, serving in Szatmár (Satu 
Mare, Romania). They divided the villages among themselves, confiscating wood, 
hay, and straw by force and without payment. Village judges and subjects were 
coerced into trading at prices that were set by the plunderers. Thus, one véka (an 
obsolete unit of  measurement) of  oats normally went for for one Gulden, but it 
also happened that soldiers would demand not one, but two, or even four véka 
in exchange for this fee. If  there was no fodder in the village, the population 
would be forced to travel to the market in Kassa or elsewhere to purchase the 
required supplies. And while market prices fluctuated, soldiers would pay for 
their foodstuffs, wine, and fodder only according to a set list of  prices, and thus 
villagers were sometimes forced to do this shopping at a loss.
In the winter, depending on the conditions, three or four of  these mounted 
gunmen would chose a county and move into a village. Once there, they would 
demand food of  the best available quality, also requisitioning free provisions 
for their wives or children or companions. First they would be given beer, and 
when it ran out, they would want the best wine. If  there was no wine, they 
would send the locals away to find some, sometimes to sources miles away. All 
in all, they indulged themselves, keeping kitchens and cellars open all day and 
night. This caused the locals to complain, as they did not have so much that they 
could satisfy their guests, who forced the peasants to do their bidding by beating 
them or threatening them with weapons. They also looted houses, taking pillows, 
beds, geese, hens, and swine, and even this was not enough, as they often seized 
everything that had not been buried. As long as the soldiers were there, they 
would want a half  véka of  fodder—nearly equivalent to a Prague bushel—for 
each horse. And if  that was not sufficient, peasants would be sent to the market 
to buy more. 
76  Hyeronimus Augustinus Ortelius, Chronologia oder Historische Beschreibung aller Kriegsempörungen und 
Belagerungen in Ungarn auch in Siebenburgen von 1395 (Nürnberg: n.p., 1602 [Reprint: Győr: Pytheas Kiadó, 
2002]), 101r-v.
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The author of  this document goes on to discuss the coming of  spring. 
Villagers were afraid of  further damage, suspecting that, beyond the usual seizures, 
the soldiers would confiscate lambs, pigs, geese, and other poultry. On top of  all 
this, some of  the mounted gunmen, unsatisfied with the aforementioned goods, 
came with wagons and took the wheat, barley, and oats that the serfs had grown 
and had it milled for their own use. These soldiers committed such plunder not 
once or twice or four times, but as often as they fancied. Thus—the noblemen’s 
complaint asserted—our villages had survived the Tatars (that is, the Ottoman 
Turks), only to be destroyed by our own mounted soldiers. Not only did the 
nobles worry that their tax-paying serfs were being plundered and impoverished, 
they were increasingly disturbed by the mercenaries’ failure to distinguish nobles 
from commoners. They ravaged estates and occupied empty houses, treating 
everyone equally. 
The local nobility argued in this petition that the soldiers of  Johann Baptista 
Pezzen’s regiment had done the greatest damage. They looted, plundered, and 
pillaged everywhere, in the courtyards and castles of  noblemen, clergymen, and 
laymen alike. They butchered countless cattle, they abused virgins and women 
of  good reputation, they committed murder and other despicable acts—it is a 
wonder that the earth did not open up and devour them.77 And thus the Court 
ordered the Szepes Chamber in Kassa to investigate the complaints of  the Upper 
Hungarian nobility, which also included the assertions that Pezzen’s infantry 
regiment had taken three or four thousand (!) horses and that the plundered 
goods of  a single captain had filled eight wagons.78
This pillage and plunder was naturally accompanied by violence and 
destruction, and military leaders struggled against such viciousness, both in their 
camp regulations and in the Artikelbrief. Thanks to these efforts, certain provisions 
of  the two documents forbade the abuse or dishonoring of  women in labor, the 
pregnant, virgins, the elderly, preachers, priests, and parish clerks. They likewise 
forbade the looting or destruction of  churches, monasteries, hermitages, and 
schools. For all such transgressions, clauses 8 and 9 of  the Artikelbrief  held out 
the possibility of  the death penalty.79 In article 53, Schwendi also forbade, under 
threat of  execution, the destruction of  crops, mills, and bakers’ ovens, by which 
provision he hoped to safeguard the army’s food sources. In addition, in article 
54, the drafters of  this document emphatically stressed that the aged and infirm, 
77  ÖStA HKA Hoffinanz (HF) Hoffinanz Ungarn (HFU), rote Nummer (RN). 77. Fol. 699r-712v.
78  Ibid., 78. Fol. 336–38 rv.
79  Janko, Lazarus Freiherr von Schwendi, 200.
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clerics, women, and small children—that is, the unarmed and those incapable 
of  bearing arms—should never beaten or killed; anyone who committed such a 
crime was to pay for it with his life. Schwendi also used the threat of  death to ward 
off  another recurrent form of  hooliganism—anyone who pilfered or set fire to a 
military camp without the express command of  his colonel was to be executed. 80 
Of  course, these official prohibitions had little actual effect on everyday practice, 
as exemplified by the sacking of  Beszterce (Bistrita, Romania) in February of  
1602. However, neither in its death toll nor in the volume of  plundered wealth 
did this incident measure up to the losses suffered by the rich city of  Magdeburg, 
which was sacked in 1631 by the soldiers of  the Catholic League, and where 
20-30,000 citizens were slaughtered.81  Thus, the Long Turkish War was marked 
by pillaging, plundering, and ransacking, just like other European theaters of  
war. However, the volume of  such depredations permanently circumscribed the 
growth of  the cities of  the Kingdom of  Hungary and Transylvania, so that 
neither in population nor in economic terms did they ever reach the size or 
potential of  similar cities in Western Europe. 
Wives and Children
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the motley crews that accompanied 
the armed forces were made up primarily of  women and children.82 In antiquity, 
it was not regarded as extraordinary for a mercenary to set off  on a military 
campaign with his wife, or even his entire family. Even into the nineteenth century, 
their presence was generally described as a common military obligation.83 Based 
on communications from the Long Turkish War and the Thirty Years’ War, it is 
possible to come up with a rough estimate of  the number of  people who stayed 
in military camps but did not fight. In a patent dated April 28, 1601, Rudolf  
II informed the magistrates of  Grundramsdorf, Neudorf, and Biedermasdorf  
that Captain Dietmayr Schiffer’s 200-man battalion, then in the service of  the 
Pope, was to be dismissed if  it were to come to any of  these three villages. 
80  Ibid., 206–07; Fritz Redlich, De praeda militari. Looting and Booty 1500–1815 (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner 
Verlag, 1956), 10–18.
81  Olaf  van, Nimwegen, The transformation of  army organisation in early-modern western Europe, 
c. 1500–1789, in European Warfare, ed. Frank Tallett and D. J. B. Trim (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), 172.
82  Burschel, Söldner im Nordwestdeutschland, 241. 
83 Christa Hämmerle, “Militärgeschichte als Geschlechtergeschichte. Von den Chancen einer 
Annäherung,” Österreichische Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaften 9 (1998): 125.
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According to this document, these soldiers were accompanied by 19 women 
and children (Trossweib und Bubeln).84 At the end of  February, 1632, after a short 
siege, the defenders of  Buxtehude surrendered the stronghold entrusted to them 
to Swedish troops, who, in exchange, promised the Imperial Guard and their 
companions a safe withdrawal. A short time later, 501 soldiers, 335 women, and 
367 children abandoned the city.85 In all probability, they belonged to a regiment 
of  Albrecht von Wallenstein’s army, then stationed at Forchheim, near Bamberg, 
at the muster of  which the enteprisers listed  2258 soldiers, 916 women, and 
521 children.86 Johann Jakob von Wallhausen, on the other hand, in his 1615 
work Kriegskunst zu Fuß (Warfare On Foot), reckoned that the recruitment of  
3000 soldiers would mean the presence of  4000 women and children (!) in their 
camp.87 This number does not appear to be an exaggeration, given that in 1573 it 
was assumed that approximately 5000 various people (footmen, servants, wives, 
prostitutes, and children) and as many as a thousand horses would accompany a 
3000-man Spanish regiment going off  to war.88
Enterprisers were generally of  the opinion that the wives and children in 
the camps were merely useless, hungry mouths89 who slowed the army down, 
contributed to rising food prices, and lowered morale. Accordingly, they renewed 
their efforts to restrict or even prohibit the hiring of  married mercenaries.90 In 
spite of  this, there were many of  them in the Christian armies of  the Long War 
and their contemporaries viewed their presence as common, even customary. 
As Ferenc Dersffy wrote in his August 13, 1597 letter to the lord lieutenant 
(supremus comes or főispán) of  Árva county, György Thurzó of  Bethlenfalva: “…
with the Germans, as they cannot be without them, there are many women.”91 
Four years later, Peter Casal wrote to Graz from the Christian encampment at 
84  HHStA MEA MPP Konv. 2. 160rv. 
85  Burschel, Söldner im Nordwestdeutschland, 241.
86  István Czigány, Reform vagy kudarc? Kísérletek a magyarországi katonaság beillesztésére a Habsburg Birodalom 
haderejébe. 1600–1700 (Budapest: Balassi Kiadó, 2004), 46–47.
87  Burschel, Söldner im Nordwestdeutschland, 227.
88  Parker, The Army of  Flanders and the Spanish Road 1567–1659, 87; Barton C. Hacker, „Women and 
Military Institutions in Early Modern Europe: A Reconnaissance,” Signs 6, no. 4 (1981): 647–48.
89  ÖStA KA AFA 598/4/ad 2; ÖStA KA HKRA Prag 1598. No. 18; ÖStA KA HKRA Wien Reg. 1603 
Juli. No. 140.
90  Geoffrey Parker, The Army of  Flanders and the Spanish Road 1567–1659. The Logistics of  Spanish Victory 
and Defeat in the Low Countries’’ Wars (Cambridge: University Press, 1972), 175; Czigány, Reform vagy kudarc?, 
46.
91  Géza Pálffy, A pápai vár felszabadításának négyszáz éves emlékezete 1597–1997 (Pápa: Jókai Mór Városi 
Könyvtár, 1997), 149.
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Kanizsa that in the two regiments hired by Gianangelo Gaudanzi di Madruzzo, 
Baron d’Avy, he had seen more women than men.92
The women and children traveling with the army were not just useless idlers 
to be fed; they took part in the everyday life and work of  the camp and tried to 
help their families earn a living. For example, they participated in the construction 
of  siege ramps. Casal, who personally took part in the siege of  Kanizsa in 1601, 
mentions several times in his letters that the women worked alongside the men 
and that several of  them were even shot.93 They also took part in the cleaning of  
the camp lavatories and in nursing the sick and the wounded.94
In addition to carrying all the family’s belongings, women cared for the 
children and looked after the animals. They washed officers’ clothes for money, 
occasionally begged for alms, and sometimes hurried to the battlefield to loot 
corpses with their husbands.95 To sustain their families, they often risked their 
lives by looking for food outside the camps. According to Casal’s description, 
food was so scarce in the camp of  the Christian army besieging Kanizsa that in 
early September of  1601 every able person left the camp armed with huge poles, 
walking as far as a mile to beat the fruit from the region’s apple and plum trees. 
In their hunger, many gorged themselves, devouring all the fruit in sight and 
subsequently falling ill.96
Enterprisers also seem to have taken advantage of  the presence of  
family members in the camps, as it happened more than once that women 
and children dressed themselves in army garments before a muster and thus 
deceived the mustering officer. The military enterpriser could then pocket the 
payments meant for those who were serving only on paper, after honoring these 
supplementals” with a few coins. Such troublesome experiences can be inferred 
from the Bestallung issued in Preiner’s name on March 15, 1602. It emphasized 
that enterprisers were not to enlist young kids (Buben), but men skilled in warfare. 
In addition, Geizkofler’s report, dated January 18, 1603, in reinforcing the edicts 
of  the 1603 Imperial Diet in Regensburg, suggested that it would be necessary to 
92  Albrecht Stauffer, “Die Belagerung von Kanizsa durch die christlichen Truppen im Jahre 1601,” 
Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung 7 (1886): 275.
93  Stauffer, “Die Belagerung von Kanizsa,” 285, 291, 294.
94  Coberus, Observationum medicarum castrensium Hungaricarum, 45.
95  Hans Wilhelm Kirchhof, Militaris disciplina, das ist Kriegs-Regiments historische vnnd außführliche 
Beschreibung, Wie, vnd was massen, solches bey vnsern löblichen Vorfahren, ... gehalten, vnd auch 
nach vnd nach verbessert worden (Frankfurt a. M.: Brathering Verlag, 1602), 107); Burschel, Söldner im 
Nordwestdeutschland, 244.
96  Stauffer, “Die Belagerung von Kanizsa,” 285.
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set up a permanent army because youngsters were enlisting at every recruitment 
drive, especially among the arquebusiers, and that they were useless and a waste 
of  food.97
Whether in the Long Turkish War or the Thirty Years’ War, if  her husband 
left her or was killed in battle, the situation of  a mercenary’s wife could change 
quickly. If  she could not support herself  or find a new husband—that is, in 
many instances—she had no other option than to prostitute herself  to survive. 
After a while, these women came to be regarded just like those who had joined 
the campaigning army as prostitutes in the first place.98
A Final, Desperate Move: Desertion, Insubordination, or Mutiny
Soldiers’ dissatisfaction was directly proportional to their unpaid wage bills 
and their hunger. The Christian army that besieged Kanizsa in 1601 included 
mercenaries from Central and Southern Italy who could not tolerate the 
Hungarian climate and often deserted the army in groups of  twenty or thirty.99 
In the spring of  1602, some privates and infantrymen from the Althan regiment, 
fed up with their unpaid wages, left their winter encampment and deserted to 
Vienna. The Emperor distributed a patent throughout the city and the entirety 
of  Lower Austria, warning residents to keep their gates closed and to check 
every passage, ferry, and customs checkpoint if  necessary. Upon capture, these 
deserters’ full names were to be reported and they were to be kept under strict 
surveillance.100 In that same year, the remaining soldiers of  Johann Baptista 
Pezzen’s regiment left their appointed winter quarters and marched back to 
Austria.101
One year later, Russworm had to investigate the revolt of  600 Dutch 
mounted gunmen who had been hired by Solms in Upper Hungary. According 
to his report, the soldiers’ disaffection and their ransacking of  the region had 
been caused by the failure to pay them, and he recommended that this be kept in 
mind in sentencing both the leaders and the participants in this mutiny.102
97  Heischmann, Die Anfange, 45–47.
98  Baumann, Landsknechte, 155–62; Burschel, Söldner im Nordwestdeutschland, 248–52.
99  Stauffer, “Die Belagerung von Kanizsa,” 301; Ortelius, Chronologia, 208r.
100  HHStA MEA MPP Konv. 2. Fol. 190r.
101  ÖStA KA HKRA Wien Exp. 1602. Mai. No. 13.
102  Ibid., Reg. 1603 Juli. No. 75.
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As described in a letter written to Rudolf  II in May of  1604, another 
thousand soldiers, these from the Mörsburg infantry regiment, also revolted 
over delinquent payments. This group left their appointed winter quarters in 
the town of  Szentgyörgy (Durdevac, Croatia), marched to Lower Austria, and 
occupied Schwechat. However, when Sulz and Bernhard Leo Gall’s infantry and 
cavalry arrived to confront them, they disavowed their mutiny and gave up their 
five chief  leaders.103
There is no doubt that the largest mutiny of  mercenaries during the Long 
Turkish War was the revolt at Pápa. By August or September of  1599, the French 
and Walloon infantry brigades in the military camp at Esztergom were on the 
verge of  open revolt. By disbursing some money, Geizkofler, the Court Military 
Council, and the Court Chamber managed to resolve the precarious situation, 
but only temporarily. In June of  1600, the French army, still lingering at their 
winter quarters in Pápa, revolted over insufficient supplies and overdue wages. It 
took a proper siege to retake the stronghold from them, and some of  them even 
defected to the Ottoman army.104 Considering all this, it is no surprise that Karl 
von Liechtenstein’s professional report argued that it was inadvisable to enlist 
additional French troops, given their unreliability. He also advised against hiring 
new Walloon mercenaries because their long marches to the battlefield greatly 
increased their cost, and their casualties could not be easily replaced. It must 
also be noted that Liechtenstein was of  the opinion that the climatic conditions 
in the Hungarian lands made Italians unfit for imperial service there; he also 
considered Cossacks marauders rather than soldiers.105
Weather and the Troops
In addition to the constant hardships soldiers faced, like mortal danger and 
unpaid wages, we have to consider two more influences on their everyday 
lives: weather and epidemics. The so-called “little ice age” was the period of  
intensified glaciation between the fourteenth and the nineteenth centuries. One 
of  its coldest periods took place at the turn of  the seventeenth century. By the 
103  Ibid., 1604 Mai. No. 118.
104  Caroline Finkel, “French Mercenaries in the Habsburg–Ottoman War of  1593–1606: the Desertion 
of  the Papa Garrison to the Ottomans in 1600,” Bulletin of  the School of  Oriental and African Studies 55, no. 
3 (1992): 451–71; Péter Sahin-Tóth, “Hitszegő hitetlenek. Francia-vallon katonák lázadása Pápa várának 
ostrománál (1600),” in Ad Astra. Sahin-Tóth Péter tanulmányai – Études de Péter Sahin-Tóth, ed. Teréz Oborni 
(Budapest: ELTE BTK, 2006), 299–363.
105  Heischmann, Die Anfange, 32.
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end of  the sixteenth century, the hot, dry summers of  the 1550s were turning 
colder and colder, with more and more precipitation. Alpine glaciers started to 
grow in the mid-1580s and kept advancing until the turn of  the century, and 
as a result, the average annual temperature dropped by 1.2-1.4 degrees Celsius. 
Summers became cooler and rainier, while winters became colder and harsher, 
and this climate change also affected the Carpathian Basin. The cold period that 
started in the middle of  the sixteenth century was at its worst between 1595 and 
1602.106
In the 1570 Artikelbrief, Schwendi required both infantry and cavalry to wear 
good coats or cloaks in order to protect themselves and their firearms from the 
cold.107 Of  course, this directive was not always obeyed. Westernach wrote in 
his October 7, 1598 report to the Court Military Council that due to the cold, 
many men were lying sick in their tents and in makeshift huts.108 One month 
later, muster inspector Kulner reported from the muster of  the Preiner regiment 
that a large part of  the infantry had fallen ill as a result of  the cold weather and 
their poor garments.109 In a volume published in 1685, Tobias Kober wrote that 
bronchitis and the common cold were regular problems in Hungary, especially 
in the encampments. Most soldiers were affected, and often suffered from 
the resulting sore throats and pulmonary diseases. Afflicting the whole body, 
these ailments contributed to the so-called “Pannonian languor” (“languores 
Pannonicos”). Old soldiers protected themselves with aqua vitae (pálinka, or vino 
sublimate), often drinking it in the morning. Mörsburg prohibited his infantrymen 
from consuming spirits, but Kober convinced him that pálinka was indeed useful 
during cold season. However, the wise doctor also added that its consumption 
could be harmful in hot weather. Some aqua vitae could drive thickened mucus 
out of  the throat, but it was thought to cause one’s bile to boil when the weather 
was hot. Thus he advised Mörsburg to consider the suitability of  the weather 
and the season, particularly in the Hungarian encampments. Having served as 
field medic to the Imperial and Royal Army in 1596 and 1597, Kober thought 
that the various natural phenomena that scourged the Christian army during the 
106  Antal Réthly, ed., Időjárási események és elemi csapások Magyarországon 1700-ig (Budapest: Akadémiai 
Kiadó, 1962), 102–17; Lajos Rácz, Magyarország éghajlattörténete az újkor idején (Szeged: Juhász Gyula 
Felsőoktatási Kiadó, 2001), 56–62; Wolfgang Behringer, A klíma kultúrtörténete. A jégkorszaktól a globális 
felmelegedésig, trans. Judit Tarnói (Budapest: Corvina Kiadó, 2010), 117–39.
107  Janko, Lazarus Freiherr von Schwendi, 200.
108  ÖStA KA HKRA Prag 1598. No. 22.
109  Ibid. No. 25.
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siege of  Buda in 1598 were actually the work of  Turkish sorcerers and Satan 
himself.110
Christian and Ottoman sources both mention that the weather during the 
siege of  Kanizsa in the autumn of  1601 was rather cold and wet. This greatly 
slowed the preparations for the siege, as the almost constant rainfall on the already 
sodden swamplands made digging siege ramps and filling the moat impossible. 
For example, their supposedly decisive assault was to start on October 28 
because the Imperial and Royal forces had been able to start the digging for the 
ramps only nine days earlier. Then, a great snowfall rendered the continuation of  
the siege impossible. The incessant rain, followed by snow and freezing dawns, 
made the conditions almost unbearable for the starving soldiers. The Southern 
Italians, who had never known such dire weather, suffered the most. To provide 
material for the sandbags they used to fill the moat, soldiers were forced to cut 
up their tents, which meant sleeping in the trenches under the open sky. It was 
no wonder that they froze to death en masse, or deserted to escape these terrible 
conditions. On their march toward Kanizsa, Russworm’s armies suffered similar 
losses. Although they had brought tents, they were unable to pitch them, and 
thus 3000 men and women and 300 horses would perish along the way.111
However, disease resulted not just from the rain and the cold, but also from 
the heat. According to Ortelius, hot weather contributed to the illnesses and 
deaths of  soldiers in the month of  August in both 1596 and 1598. In both 
instances, dehydration led to fatigue and eventually to death.112
Hygiene in the camps was also a serious problem. Fronsberger’s work 
contains an undated set of  regulations which established strict sanitary procedures 
for camp latrines and abattoirs in hopes of  preventing epidemics.113 However, 
outbreaks of  contagious diseases could not be avoided. As a result of  haphazard 
burial practices and a lack of  basic hygiene, an epidemic broke out during the 
110  Coberus, Observationum medicarum castrensium Hungaricarum, 5–9.
111  Stauffer, “Die Belagerung von Kanizsa,” 265–313; Imre Karácson, trans., and Gyula Szekfű, ed., 
Török történetírók, vol. 3 (1566–1659) (Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1916), 162–64, 306–307, 
309–34, passim; Florio Banfi, “Gianfrancesco Aldobrandini magyarországi hadivállalatai,” Hadtörténelmi 
Közlemények 41 (1940): 150–54; Tóth, A mezőkeresztesi csata, 340–44, passim; Ortelius, Chronologia, 207r–12v, 
passim; Balázs Sudár, “Kanizsa 1601. évi ostroma török szemmel,” Hadtörténelmi Közlemények 118, no. 4 
(2006): 1025–58, passim.
112  Ortelius, Chronologia, 112, 153.
113  Leonhard Fronsperger, Von Schanzen vnnd Befestigungen vmb die Feldtlager auffzuwerffen, (Frankfurt am 
Main, 1573), XXIIIv; László Takáts, Endre Szemkeö, and László Vámos, “Magyarországi tábori kórház 
szervezési és működési elve 1692-ben,” Orvostörténeti Közlemények/Communcationes de Historia Artis Medicine 
10 (1977): 58.
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siege of  Esztergom in 1595; its casualties included deputy commander Karl von 
Mansfeld.114 Kober also reports that one year later, a physician who had arrived 
with the troops from Upper Austria also died during an epidemic at the siege of  
Hatvan. When the defenders’ artillery forced his camp into retreat and he was 
out tending to the wounded, Leonhard Rauwolff  drank from the Zagyva river 
(“Hadwaniensisaquae”), at which point, according to Kober, the urine and feces in 
the water poisoned him. The old medic was ignored in the camp, was not treated 
adequately, and eventually died of  constant diarrhea that September.115 Two years 
later, as the Christian army was retreating to the Szigetköz, the flooding Danube 
soaked their camp. The resulting epidemic afflicted Adolf  von Schwarzenberg, 
Bernhard Leo Gall, and Geizkofler, but in the end, only a few of  their cohort 
would die of  it.116
Conclusion
The entirety of  Austro-Hungarian and European society was represented in the 
Imperial and Royal Army at the end of  the sixteenth century. We find soldiers 
who enlisted out of  a sense of  Christian duty, impoverished nobles, and citizens 
seeking honor and adventure. As in the Thirty Years’ War, however, it was the 
penniless who made up the great mass of  the armed forces. Trying to escape 
poverty and starvation, these initially unarmed recruits and their families had to 
face everyday dangers in the Hungarian theater of  war: mortal violence, destitution 
caused by unpaid wages, epidemics, and exposure to the elements. They strove 
to survive through fraud and deceit, as well as by looting and ransacking their 
environment. Already by the end of  the fourteenth century, their rulers had been 
trying, through various decrees, to prohibit such “solutions”, but in vain—their 
everyday survival strategies simply did not comport with the norms set down for 
them by the authorities.117
Joining the military did not solve the long-term problem of  subsistence. 
Even so, it happened more than once during the Long Turkish War that more 
people showed up at a muster of  a regiment than could be accommodated. For 
many, there was no way to return to their former lives. They spent the time 
114  Gábor Kazinczy, ed., Illésházy István nádor följegyzései 1592–1603 (Pest: Eggenberger Ferdinánd Magyar 
Akadémiai Könyvárus, 1863), 23; Istvánffy, Magyarok dolgairól, 207.
115  Coberus, Observationum medicarum castrensium Hungaricarum, 16–17.
116  Ortelius, Chronologia, 153.
117  Redlich, De praeda militari, 6–18.
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between their terms of  service wandering about as vagrants (gartender Knecht), 
waiting to be mustered again.118 
These roving, armed soldiers and their families, meanwhile, tried to support 
themselves by means of  minor (or more serious) criminal acts, often imposing 
significant burdens on local populations. However, these methods allowed 
soldiers to secure a living for themselves and their families only in the short 
term. And because of  they were under-housed and perpetually malnourished, 
their constitutions were even less capable of  withstanding the climatic ordeals 
and accompanying illnesses that confronted them on the battlefields of  Hungary. 
It is important to reiterate that among the soldiers who arrived in the 
Kingdom of  Hungary in this period, we find the unprepared and unqualified 
alongside mercenaries who had fought in numerous campaigns and knew their 
weapons well. Therefore, it is incorrect to assume that every recruit who reached 
the Hungarian theater of  war would have been completely unprepared militarily; 
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